Shenoy and Shafer [11] demonstrated that both for Dempster-Shafer Theory and probability theory there exists a possibility to calculate efficiently marginals of joint belief distributions (by so-called local computations) provided that the joint distribution can be decomposed (factorized) into a belief network. 
Introduction
Many researchers consider the theory of evidence a proper tool for representation of uncertainty. It has been developed by Dempster [3] and Shafer [10] and possesses several interesting properties. one of them is that if we are able to factorize a joint belief distribution into a hyper-graph structure (that is to represent it as combination of simpler belief functions) then there exists the possibility of local computations of marginals of the joint belief distribution as well as conditionals of some variables on various events without actually calculating this joint belief distribution [11] . This is of tremendous importance if we imagine how much space in computer memory would be required to represent a joint belief distribution in, say, 20 variables.
The Shenoy-Shafer theory of local computations makes marginalizations and calculation of conditionals for belief functions more feasible.
Actually to exploit this fine property we need a tool for factorizing the joint belief distribution into such factors. From the experience with probability distributions it is known that they may be represented in form of bayesian networks, that is directed acyclic graphs reflecting dependencies between variables. These directed acyclic graphs (dag) may be transformed directly to hypergraphs being precisely frameworks for factoriozatiions required by the Shenoy-Shafer theory of local computations. A number of techniques of decomposition of a joint probability distribution into bayesian networks have been developed. In this paper we want to find an analogous decomposition of a joint belief distribution following the outlines of Spirtes et al approach [13] , which has been developed for probability distributions.
In Section 2 we will briefly recall basic definitions of the DS theory of evidence. Section 3 will recall the Shenoy-Shafer requirements for local computations of a joint distribution. Section 4 is devoted to selection of proper conditional belief definition. Section 5 introduces my own sense of conditionality. Section 6 develops the algorithm. Section 7 contains some conclusions.
Formal Definition of the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence
Let us make the remark that if an object is described by a set of discrete attributes (features, variables) X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n taking values from their respective domains Ξ 1 , Ξ 2 , ..., Ξ n then we can think of it as being described by a complex attribute X having vector values, that is the domain Ξ of X is equal: Ξ = {(x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n )|x i ∈ Ξ i ∀i = 1, ..., n} . However sometimes we will treat X as a set of attributes applying set-theoretic operations ∩, ∪, − understanding, that there exists some natural ordering among the attributes constituting X so that any non-empty "subset" Y of X Y ⊆ X is a Cartesian product of its "components": Y = X k1 × X k2 × . . . × X km , where indices k 1 , k 2 , ..., k m are an increasing subsequence from the sequence 1, 2, ..., n.
So in definitions below let us assume that we are talking of objects described by a single attribute X taking its values from the domain Ξ. We say that Ξ, the domain of X is our space of discernment spanned by the attribute X. We shall also briefly say that X is our space of discernment instead.
The function m (Mass Function, or basic probability assignment function bpa) is defined as where |.| means the absolute value operator. If also
holds, than we talk of (intrinsic) Mass Function.
Definition 2
Whenever m(A) > 0, we say that A is the focal point of the Bel-Function.
For the purpose of this paper we define the Bel-function as follows. If Bel is a Belief Function then Pl is a Plausibility Function.
For completeness let us recall also the Q-Function of the DS-Theory.
Now let us define the marginalization and extension for Bel-Functions:
Definition 9 Let X = X 1 ×X 2 be our space of discernment for which the m, and its Bel, Pl and Q functions are defined.
The m function marginalized (projected) onto the subspace X 1 , denoted as m ↓X1 is defined as: .The functions Bel ↓X1 , P l ↓X1 and Q ↓X1 are defined accordingly to Bel, Pl and Q definitions above with respect to m ↓X1 as their (pseudo-)mass function.
Definition 10 Let X 1 be our space of discernment for which the m, and its Bel, Pl and Q functions are defined.
The m function empty-extended onto the superspace X = X 1 × X 2 , denoted as m ↑X is defined as: Please notice that the operator ⊕ is defined for combination of Bel's only for the same space of discernment. Should it happen, however that Bel 1 is defined over the space X 1 × X 3 , and Bel 2 over X 2 × X 3 , then instead of writing:
we will simply write
whenever no misunderstandings may occur.
Prerequisites for Shenoy-Shafer Propagation
We cite below extensively the paper [11] of Shenoy and Shafer to recall some basic notions and to show usefulness of decomposition of the DS joint belief distribution in terms of a belief network.. In case of probabilities a valuation on h will be a non-negative, real-valued function on the set of all configurations of h(a configuration on h is a vector of possible values of variables in h). In the belief function case a valuation is a non-negative, real-valued function on the set of all subsets of configurations of h.
Proper valuation: for each h ⊆ V there is a subset P h of V V h elements of which are called proper valuations on h. Let P be the set of all proper valuations.
Combination: We assume that there is a mapping ⊙ : In case of probabilities, combination is value-by-value multiplication. In case of DS-theory -it is the Dempster rule operator ⊕ (previous section).
Marginalization: We assume that there is a mapping ↓ h : {V V g |g ⊆ h} → V V h called marginalization to h such that:
(i) if G is a valuation on g and h ⊆ g then G ↓h is a valuation on h.
(ii) if G is a proper valuation then G ↓h is a proper valuation (iii) if G is a not proper valuation then G ↓h is not a proper valuation
In case of probabilities, marginalization is the summation over the dropped dimension(s). In case of DS-theory -it is the Dempster-Shafer marginalization.
Axiom A1: (Cummutativity and associativity of combination). Suppose G,H,K are valuations on g, h, k
Axiom A2: (Consonance of marginalization) Suppose G is a valuation on g, and suppose
Axiom A3: (Distributivity of marginalization over combination) Suppose G and H are valuations on g and
Hypergraph: We call a non-empty set HV of non-empty subsets of a finite set of V a hypergraph on V.
We call the elements of HV hyperedges. We call the elements of V nodes.
Factorization: Suppose A is a valuation on a finite set of variables V, and suppose HV is a hypergraph on V. If A is equal to the combination of valuations of all hyperedges h of HV then we say that A factorizes on HV.
The axiom A3 states that to compute (G ⊙ H) ↓g it is not necessary to compute G ⊙ H first.
Shenoy and Shafer consider it unimportant whether or not the factorization should refer to conditional probabilities in case of probabilistic belief networks. We shall make at this point the remark that for expert system inference engine it is of primary iomportance how the contents of the knowledge base should be understood by the user as beside computation an expert system is expected at least to justify its conclusions and it can do so only referring to elements of the knowledge base. So if a belief network (or a hypergraph)
is to be used as the knowledge base, as much elements as possible have to refer to experience of the user.
In our opinion, the major reason for this remark of Shenoy and Shafer is that in fact the DempsterShafer belief function cannot be decomposed in terms of conditional belief functions as they are defined in the literature. This claim is demonstrated in the next section. Thereafter we introduce our own definition of conditionality for the DS theory.
Definitions of Conditionality in Literature
The probability update function cond B with respect to the event (evidence) B is defined (e.g. in [6] ) as a partial function from the set of probability functions into the set of probability functions. As usual, let cond B (P r) = P r(.|B) (P r stands for "probability"). It is known that then if • denotes the operator of update combination tthen the following holds:
The belief update function be defined (after e.g. [6] ) with respect to evidence B (cond B ) as a partial function from the set of belief functions into the set of belief functions.
Dempsterian Interpretation of Conditional Belief
Dempster [3] defined conditional belief function for a Bel function conditioned on the event B as:
(notation after [6] ) with Bel B being the determinictic function of belief into validity of the event B, that is m B (B) = 1 and m B (A) = 0 for every A = B. It has been shown that
which implies directly:
It is easy to show that for cond B = Bel(.||B) the following holds:
Halpernian Interpretation of Conditional Belief
Halpern and Fagin [6] insisted on treating the belief function as generalized probability.
Let P be a set of probability functions defined over a sample space Ξ. A lower envelop of P is defined as a function f such that for every A ⊆ Ξ f(A)=inf(Pr(A);Pr ⊆ P (Pr means probability), A is measurable with respect to Pr). Thee upper envelop is defined respectively (as supremum). Let Bel be a belief function defined over Ξ,and let ( Ξ, A , Pr) be a probability space. We say that Pr is consistent with Bel, if Though every belief function is a lower envelop, not every lower envelop is a belief function.
Let for the belief function Bel P Bel denote the set of all probability functions consistent with Bel. It has been shown [6] that if Bel is a belief function over Ξ, then for every A, A ⊆ Ξ we have:
Halpern and Fagin define conditional belief function with respect to the event B Bel(A|B) with respect to the belief functiona Bel() as:
Bel(A|B) = inf P r∈P Bel P r(A|B) P l(A|B) = sup P r∈P Bel P r(A|B)
It has been shown [6] that if Bel() is a belief function such that Bel(B) > 0, then
It has been shown further [6] that that then Bel(.|B) is a belief function and P l(.|B) the respective plausibility function.
One may be tempted by analogy to probability update function to define cond B = Bel(.|B). However, it has been shown that in general case for the belief functions:
Kyburgian Definitions of Conditionality
Kyburg [8] was probably the first to demonstrate that a belief function may be represented as an envelop of a family of traditional probability functions.. He proved also that the following holds:
He considered also non-deterministic evidence. He defined non-deterministic conditional probability with respect to event B with probability p as (Jeffry-rule):
(Notice that: P (B|B) = 1, and P (B| p B) = p),
In analogy to the above definitions, he defined also two new types of non-deterministic conditional belief functions: First of them in analogy to Dempsterian conditional belief: Let Bel p,B , be the so-called simple belief function such that m p,B (B) = p and m p,B (Ξ) = 1 − p, and for other subsets of Ξ m is equal 0, with Ξ being the universe (the space of discernment). Then conditional belief Bel(.|| p B) is defined as
that is as Dempsterian combination of belief function and the simple belief function.
On the other hand, he introduced also a generalized "envelop" definition of the conditional belief function:
and subsequently he has shown that
Criticism of the Notions of Conditionality
The "envelop" definitions of conditionality (Bel(.|B), Bel(.| p B) above) share one property making then not suitable for Shenoy-Shafer propagation: the belief update function is in general not cumutative, hence the sequence of usage of evidence proves to be of importance, and hence the Axiom A1 is violated.
It should also be mentioned that Smets [12] sharply criticizes envelop interpretations proposed by Kyburg, Halpern and Fagin as well as earlier by Dempster (see above) as misleading and not compatible with the spirit of the DST.
On the other hand, we would expect of a conditional belief function that :
Bel = Bel(.||B) ⊕ Bel B , but obviously this is not the case (in general it is not true that:
Hence it is impossible that the factorization using Bel(.||B) may reflect the function Bel.
Under these circumstances one should plainly ask: why not to try the expression There are several severe reasons why this amazingly simple idea may have not been exploited in the past:
(i) in general, Bel |h is not unique.
(ii) in general, Bel |h is not a belief function (it is only a pseudo-belief function, with Q-values being nonnegative).
In order to exploit still the results of Shenoy-Shafer, it must be stated that neither the dempsterian combination nor dempsterian marginalization leads outside the set of pseudo-belief function set. Hence it may be easily shown that Shenoy-Shafer axioms apply also to pseudo-belief functions. Given this prerequisite, we develop in the subsequent sections a theory of identification of DS belief networks following results obtained by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [13] for probabilistic belief networks.
An Alternative Definition of Conditionality and Implications
In [7] we have introduced a new frequentist interpretation of DS Belief function. Under this interpretation we introduced the notion of composite measurement of two variables X 1 , X 2 , a notion of statistical independence of Bel functions closely related to the empty extension and we introduced a new notion of conditionality.
Below we briefly summarize this interpretation:
F. Bacchus in his paper [1] on axiomatization of probability theory and first order logic shows that we change it to be similar to the universal and existential quantifiers throughout this paper. Furthermore, Morgan [9] insisted that the probabilities be always considered in close connection with the population they refer to. Bacchus' expression [α(x)] x we rewrite as:
α(x) -the probability of α(x)] being true within the population P. The P (population) is a unary predicate with P(x)=TRUE indicating that the object x(∈ Ω, that is element of a universe of objects)
belongs to the population under considerations. If P and P' are populations such that
(that is membership in P' implies membership in P, or in other words: P' is a subpopulation of P), then we distinguish two cases:
x P ′ (x)) = 0 (that is probability of membership in P' with respect to P is equal 0) -then (according to [9] for any expression α(x) in free variable x the following holds for the population P':
) > 0then (according to [9] for any expression α(x) in free variable x the following holds for the population P':
We also use the following (now traditional) mathematical symbols: 
where Ω is the set of objects, (or population of objects) such that
• whenever M (ω, A) = T RU E for ω ∈ Ω, A ⊆ Ξ and if card(A) > 1 then there exists B, B ⊂ A such that M (ω, B) = T RU E holds.
• for every ω and every A either M (ω, A) = T RU E or M (ω, A) = F ALSE (but never both).
M (ω, A) indicates that for the object ω the value of the attribute X has a non-empty intersection with the set A Definition 13 A label of an object ω ∈ Ω is a subset of the domain Ξ of the attribute X.
A labeling under the measurement method M is a function l : Ω → 2 Ξ such that for any object ω ∈ Ω either
By a population under the labeling l we understand the predicate P : Ω → {T RU E, F ALSE} of the form P (ω) = T RU E if f l(ω) = ∅ (or alternatively, the set of objects for which this predicate is true)
If for every object of the population the label is equal to Ξ then we talk of an unlabeled population (under the labeling l), otherwise of a pre-labelled one.
Definition 14 Let l be a labeling under the measurement method M . Let us consider the population under this labeling. The modified measurement method
where Ω is the set of objects, is is defined as
Definition 15 Let P be a population and l its labeling. Then
P are Mass, Belief, Plausibility and Q Functions in the sense of the Dempster-Shafer Theory resp. Definition 16 Let M be a measurement method, l be a labeling under this measurement method, and P be a population under this labeling (Note that the population may also be unlabeled). let us take a set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of attribute values {L 1 , L 2 , ..., L k } and let us define the probability
The (general) labelling process on the population P is defined as a (randomized) functional LP : 2
where Γ is the set of all possible labelings under M , and ∆ is a set of all possible probability of selection functions, such that for the given labeling l and a given set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of
k it delivers a new labeling l" such that for every object ω ∈ Ω:
k ; This sampling is done independently for each individual object, 
It is easy to show that THEOREM 3 Let M be a measurement function, l a labeling, P a population under this labeling. Let LP be a generalized labeling process and let l" be the result of application of the LP for the set of labels from the
. Let P" be a population under the labeling l". Then the expected value over the set of all possible resultant labelings l" (and hence populations P") (or, more precisely, value vector) of Bel
P " is a combination via DS Combination rule of Bel
Let us assume that our space of discernment consists of the attributes
Let us understand the marginal distribution of X i as follows: the measurement method for the subspace X i be equal to the logical sum of all the measurements on sets from X compatible with the given set in X i .
This implies immediately that
As the above relationship holds and we are subsequently concerned with only one population P, we will drop indices referring to the measurement method and the population relying only on projections.
Let us now introduce the notion of quantitative independence for DS-Theory.
Definition 17 Two variables X 1 , X 2 are (mutually, marginally) quantitatively independent when for objects of the population knowledge of the truth value of M
Definition 18 Two variables X 1 , X 2 are measured compositely iff for A ⊆ Ξ 1 , B ⊆ Ξ 2 for every object ω:
and whenever M (ω, B) is sought,
Under these circumstances, it is easily shown that whenever m(B) > 0, then there exist A and C such that: B = A × C.
So we obtain:
THEOREM 5 If variables X 1 , X 2 are quantitatively independent and measured compositely, then
Hence the Belief function can be calculated from Belief functions of independent variables under composite measurement:
THEOREM 6 If variables X 1 , X 2 are quantitatively independent and measured compositely, then
Let us justify now the notion of empty extension:
Definition 19 The joint distribution over X = X 1 × X 2 in variables X 1 , X 2 is quantitatively independent of the variable X 1 when for objects of the population for every A,A ⊆ Ξ 1 × Ξ 2 knowledge of the truth value of M ↓X1 l (object, A ↓X1 ) does not change our prediction capability of the values of M l (object, A), that is
The joint distribution over X = X 1 × X 2 in variables X 1 , X 2 , measured compositely, is independent of the variable X 1 only if m ↓X2 (Ξ 2 ) = 1 that is the whole mass of the marginalized distribution onto X 2 is concentrated at the only focal point Ξ 2 .
↑X that is Bel is the empty extension of some Bel defined only over X 2 , then the Bel is independent of the variable X 2 .
If for a Bel over X = X 1 × X 2 with X 1 , X 2 measured compisitely Bel is independent of X 2 , then Bel = (Bel ↓X2 ) ↑X .
In the light of the above theorem, and taking into account that a belief function which is an empty extension of another function may be stored in a compressed manner, we shall say Definition 20 Let Bel be defined over X 1 × X 2 . We shall speak that Bel is compressibly independent of X 2
REMARK: m ↓X1 (Ξ 1 ) = 1 does not imply empty extension as such, especially for non-sigleton values of the variable X 2 . As previously with marginal independence, it is the composite measurement that makes the empty extension a practical notion.
Let us consider now the conditional independence:
Let us introduce a concept of conditionality related to the above definition of independence. Traditionally, conditionality is introduced to obtain a kind of independence between variables de facto on one another. So let us define that:
Definition 21 For discourse spaces of the form X = X 1 × ... × X n we define conditional belief function
Let us notice at this point that the conditional belief as defined above does not need to be unique, hence
we have here a kind of pseudoinversion of the ⊕ operator. Furthermore, the conditional belief does not need to be a belief function at all, because some focal points m may be negative. But it is then the pseudo-belief function in the sense of the DS-theory as the Q-measure remains positive. Please recall the fact that if
, c being a proportionality factor (as all supersets of a set are contained in all intersections of its supersets and vice versa). Hence also for our conditional belief definition:
We shall talk later of unnormalized conditional belief
Let us now reconsider the problem of independence, this time of a conditional distribution of (X 1 × X 2 × X 3 |X 1 × X 3 ) from the third variable X 3 .
THEOREM 9 Let X = X 1 × X 2 × X 3 and let Bel be defined over X. Furthermore let Bel X|X1×X3 be a conditional Belief conditioned on variables X 1 , X 3 . Let this conditional distribution be compressibly independent of X 3 . Let Bel ↓X1×X2 be the projection of Bel onto the subspace spanned by X 1 , X 2 . Then there exists Bel ↓X1×X2|X1 being a conditional belief of that projected belief conditioned on the variable X 1 such that this Bel X|X1×X3 is the empty extension of Bel
Let us notice that under the conditions of the above theorem
and hence for any Bel
and therefore
This means that whenever the conditional Bel X1×X2×X3|X1×X3 is compressibly independent of X 3 , then there exists a conditional Bel X1×X2×X3|X1×X2 compressibly independent of X 2 . But this fact combined with the previous theorem results in:
THEOREM 10 Let X = X 1 × X 2 × X 3 and let Bel be defined over X. Furthermore let Bel
X|X1×X3
be a conditional Belief conditioned on variables X 1 , X 3 . Let this conditional distribution be compressibly independent of X 3 . Then the empty extension onto X of any Bel ↓X1×X2|X1 being a conditional belief of projected belief conditioned on the variable X 1 is a conditional belief function of X conditioned on variables
In this way we obtained some sense of conditionality suitable for decomposition of a joint belief distribution. The match can be χ 2 -tested. The following formula should be followed for calculation
The number of df is calculated as
In case of independence of a distribution from one variable one needs to calculate the marginal of the distribution of that variable, say X i . Then the measure of discrepancy from the assumption of independence is given as:
Statistically we can test, based on Bernoullie distribution, what is the lowest possible and the highest possible value of 1 − m ↓Xi (Ξ i ) for a given significance level of the true underlying distribution.
In case of independence between the conditional distribution and one of conditioning variables, however, it is useless to calculate the pseudoinversion of ⊕, as we are working then with a population and a sample the size of which is not properly defined (by the "anti-labeling"). But we can build the contingency table of the unconditional joint distribution for the independent variable on the one hand and the remaining variables on the other hand, and compare the respective cells on how do they match the distribution we would obtain assuming the independence. So let m be a Mass Function for the variable X = X 1 × X 2 × X 3 . Composite measurement of X 1 , X 2 , X 3 is to be assumed. We want to show that X 1 conditioned on X 2 is independent of 3 . We calculate Q of m, and Q ↓X2 , Q ↓X1×X2 , Q ↓X2×X3 . We define Q t to be a Q-function calculated as follows:
c -a normalizing constant. Let m t be the (Pseudo-)Mass Function corresponding to Q t . Should m t (A) have a negative mass for any set A ⊆ Ξ, so the hypothesis of independence should be viewed as statistically 
The number of degrees of freedom for the χ 2 test would then be the product: (the number of focal points of the projection of the joint distribution onto X 1 × X 2 minus one) * (the number of focal points of the projection of the joint distribution onto X 2 × X 3 minus one). 
DS Belief Network -Definition and Properties
Please pay attention to the expression any distribution in front of the conditional distribution as more than one conditional distribution is possible. We may well imagine a situation where the decomposition of a joint belief distribution may be valid for some and not for the other set of conditional beliefs. Some important properties follow from this definition:
THEOREM 11 Let DSN=(D,Bel) be a belief network with Bel equal to
Let j be a node in D without any outcoming edges (a terminal node). Then the following holds:
PROOF: Let Bel 2 be a pseudo-belief function defined over the set of variables g ∪h, and Bel 1 be a pseudobelief function defined over g ∪ {X}, X ∈ g, X ∈ h, g ∩ h = ∅. both at zero and non-zero Q-points.
What is more, Bel 2 is a belief function (and not only a pseudo-belief function). Q.e.d.✷
This is an important theorem as it states that a properly chosen subnetwork reflects a sub Belief function.
Definition 23 [4]
A trail in a dag is a sequence of links that form a path in the underlying undirected graph. A node β is called a head-to-head node with respect to a trail t if there are two consecutive links α → β and β ← γ on that t.
Definition 24 [4]
A trail t connecting nodes α and β is said to be active given a set of nodes L, if (1) every head-to-head-node wrt t either is or has a descendent in L and (2) every other node on t is outside L.
Otherwise t is said to be blocked (given L). It has been shown in [5] that THEOREM 12 Let L be a set of nodes in a dag D, and let α, β / ∈ L be two additional nodes in D. Then α and β are connected via an active trail (given L) iff α and β are connected via a simple (i.e. not possessing cycles in the underlying undirected graph) active trail (given L).
We claim that:
THEOREM 13 Let n be a node in a dag D. Let D' be a subgraph of D such that all (and only) outcoming edges of n are removed. Let L be a set of nodes in the dag D (and hence D') containing n (n ∈ L), and let a) 
be a DS belief network}. Then:
PROOF: The "only if" part (soundness) states that whenever I(J, K|L) D holds in D, it must represent an independence that holds in every underlying distribution. We prove it as follows: Let us take a node l in L having no predecessor in L. Let us try to calculate the conditional distribution on l. if n were a root node (without incoming edges) then simply
Otherwise we have to transform the node l into such one. First let us exploit the previous theorem and remove all nodes not being predecessors of l and not l itself from the graph. The remaining dag represents the joint distribution projected onto the remaining nodes. Let us take the youngest predecessor of l (that is a node l' not having a successor which were predecessor of l). Let us consider the two factors:
It is easy to check that the above DS combination is equal to: Bel
The above expression may be easily transformed into equivalent Bel
This means that the node l' can be made now a terminal node and the process of node removal may be continued until l becomes a root node (that is a node without predecessors).
Let us consider now the respective graph transformations. The outgoing edges of the node l can be removed as shown previously without deactivation of active trails and without introducing new ones (see e.g. Fig.1 ). The change of direction of the edge (l',l) with introduction of new edges does not affect active trails either (some of them are only shortened, a head-=to-head-meeting is by-passedsee e.g. Fig.2 ). Hence we can move all the nodes of L to become either root nodes or to have only nodes from L as predecessors. If we remove now these nodes from the transformed graph, then the remaining graph will represent the conditional distribution on these nodes. And all the active trails will not contain any head-to-head meeting. Hence two nodes α and β not connected by an active trail will neither possess a common predecessor nor be a successor of one another. Let us remove stepwise terminal nodes not being α,β. A graph consisting of two disjoint graphs with α,β as solely terminal nodes of each. Then obviously their calculations of marginals may be separated in the remaining dag.
Hence missing active trail implies independence statement.
The "if" part (completeness) asserts that any independence that is not detected by d-separation cannot be shared by all distributions in P D and hence cannot be revealed by non-numeric methods. we prove it by construction of an example as follows: If there exists an active p-trail connecting nodes i,j then by graph transformations (edge removal and edge reversal, thereafter terminal node removal) as described above we obtain a final graph for which either i and j have a common predecessor k or there exists an oriented path connecting both i,j. Let X i , X j , X k be variables associated with nodes i,j,k.
In the first case (common predecessor) let Y 1 ,...,Y m be variables associated with nodes on the directed path from k to i, let Z 1 ,...,Z n be variables associated with nodes on the directed path from k to j. a) In b) the direction of edge (X 2 , X 6 ) has been reversed and edges (X 1 , X 6 ), (X 5 , X 2 ) and (X 7 , X 2 ) have been added Furthermore, let the conditional beliefs associated with the nodes be constructed as follows: the only focal points are (c -normalizing constants) Node k:
Nodes on the path from k to i (r=1,...,m+1, Y 0 means X k , Y m+1 means X i ):
Nodes on the path from k to j (r=1,...,n+1, Z 0 means X k , Z n+1 means X j ):
It is immediately visible that the joint belief distribution of X i and its predecessors in the remaining graph can be expressed as the only focal points:
Hence obviously:
In the same way we show that:
and that
But we see immediately, that if
which is obviously different from Bel ↓{Xi,Xj } . This means, however, that for any dependence in the sense of d-separation we are actually capable to construct a joint belief distribution from the family of compatible distributions such that there is a dependence in the distribution corresponding to the d-separation dependence.
In the same manner we can proceed in case of a direct oriented path from i to j or from j to i. Again we will manage to construct a belief function where missing d-separation at a given point indicates dependence in the distribution. Q.e.d.✷
Principles for Construction of dag from Data
Many writers have connected causality with statistical dependence. We parallel here [13] in formulating the following principles, while understanding independence as given by definitions Def.17 and 19
Definition 27 Let V be a set of random variables with a joint DS-belief distribution. We say that variables Please notice that Principle III bears close resemblance with theorem 14. It actually transfers a fine property of family of belief networks into a criterion for building a belief network. A weak point of such a criterion is that a decision whether or not an edge is to be included into the underlying dag is based on the whole (at the moment of edge inclusion unknown) structure of the target dag.
Fortunately, as we will show below, Principle III implies both Principles I and II. This means that Principles I and II, being local with respect to the target dag, may provide useful initial hints for construction of the target dag. What is more, Principles I and II combined with dag definition imply Principle III which means that we can indeed construct the whole dag structure exploiting only local properties of the target dag.
Let us introduce some notions. First let us define a partially oriented graph (pog) as a structure (V ,E,O), with V being the set of nodes, E being the set of edges with an edge being a subset of V with cardinality 2, O:E→ 2 V ×V being the orientation function of edges assigning each edge {X i , X j } in E either the orientation
(both from X i to X j ) and from X j to X i ). The last orientation is an unpleasant one, but may occur in processes described below, If the first (empty) orientation is assigned, the edge is called unoriented, otherwise it is called oriented.
Furthermore let us call two edges neighbouring edges iff they share a vertex. Let {X i , X j } and {X k , X j } be neighbouring edges (they share X j so they are neighbouring at X j ). We call them bridged edges iff there exists an edge {X i , X k } in E. Otherwise they are called unbridged. The edge {X i , X j } (with respect to the neighbouring pair of edges) is said to be head-to-neighbour oriented iff (
The edge {X i , X j } (with respect to the neighbouring pair of edges) is said to be tail-to-neighbour oriented iff
We claim the following:
THEOREM 15 Let Bel be a DS-belief distribution represented by an acyclic directed graph G according to Principle III. Then G is an orientation (G has the undirected structure) of the undirected graph U that represents Bel according to Principle I.
PROOF:
If two nodes/variables X i and X j are connected via an undirected edge within the Ugraph generated by Principle I, then there exists no set of variables Y 1 , ...., Y k such that for ev-
..,Y k } as otherwise the edge would not be inserted. Assume for a moment Principle III would not generate a directed edge connecting both variables in a directed graph D. Then in this D-graph a d-separation of both variables can be found: take simply the set of nodes which directly precede any of the variables. But this would enforce conditional independence in contradiction with the result established previously. So any edge generated by Principle I is also present in every graph generated by Principle III. PROOF: Let us consider the graph U generated by Principle I. Let us consider partial orientations of the graph U generated from it by Principle II. It is easily seen that there may be only one such orientation.
Let us turn our attention to Theorem 16. Let us consider a head-to-head meeting of directed edges (X i , X l ), (X j , X l ) generated by Principle II, that is X i , X j not being directly connected in U, X i , X l being directly connected in U, X j , X l being directly connected in U, no set containing X l rendering X i , X j independent. Then Principle III has also to generate this head-to-head meeting as the existence of the trail of directed edges (X i , X l ), (X j , X l ) guarantees in this case that no d-separation containing X l exists. So every head-to-head-meeting generated by Principle II occurs also in every graph generated by Principle III. On the other hand, if during testing independence by means of Principle II for the edges (X i , X l ), (X j , X l ) a set containing X l was detected such that it renders X i , X j independent, then head-to-head meeting of these edges must not occur if Principle III is applied. Q.e.d.✷
In this way we have established that: if there exists a dag of the distribution generated by Principle III, then application of Principles I and II will deliver its undirected structure and orientation of all those unbridged pairs of arcs which meet head-to-head at a node. (So if the intrinsic graph is given by Fig.3 then Principle II yields a graph given by Fig.5 ).
Let us now discuss which orientations of other arcs are established rigidly by Principle III. Pearl's definition of d-separation refers to arc orientation at following nodes: (1) head-to-head nodes (2) direct and indirect descendants of head-to-head nodes So let us establish the following principle:
Principle II c Let H be a partially oriented graph generated by Principles I and II. Whenever {X i , X j } and {X k , X j } are neighbouring unbridged edges, with {X i , X j } being head-to-neighbour oriented and
Please notice that Principle II c is a kind of operationalization of Principle II, as it is a direct consequence of the "if and only if" expression in Principle II. It has been introduced because the formulation of Principle II directs our attention to orienting edges head-to-head, but it is less obvious that it also implies some head-to-tail orientations.
Obviously, the following theorem holds:
THEOREM 17 Principle III implies Principle II c .
The Theorem is obvious if we consider the previous ones. (So if the intrinsic graph is given by Fig.3 then Principle II c yields a graph given by Fig.6 ).
Furthermore let us introduce the following principle:
Principle IV: Let H be a partially oriented graph generated by Principles I and II and II c . Let the subgraph H' of H contain only oriented edges in H. Let {X i , X j } be an unoriented edge in H. If X j is a descendent of X i in H', then orient this edge from X i to X j . Apply thereafter Principle II c exhaustively.
Obviously THEOREM 18 Dag-structure and Principle III imply Principle IV.
(So if the intrinsic graph is given by Fig.3 then Principle IV yields a graph given by Fig.7 ).
Principle V: Let H be a partially oriented graph generated by Principles I and II. Let the unbridged edges {X i , X j }, {X k , X j } be oriented head-to-head by Principle II. Let both edges Figure 6 : A partially oriented graph due to Principle II c (arrow (X 6 , X 8 )) Figure 7 : A partially oriented graph due to Principle IV (arrows (X 7 , X 8 ), (X 5 , X 8 )) Figure 8 : A partially oriented graph due to Principle V (arrow (X 1 0, X 9 )). Nodes X 1 , X 3 , X 8 , X 9 are legitimately removable.
both edges {X k , X l }, {X j , X l }, or all the edges {X i , X l }, {X k , X l }, {X j , X l } be left unoriented in the process. Then orient {X j , X l } as from X l to X j . Apply thereafter Principles II c , IV exhaustively.
(If the intrinsic graph is given by Fig.3 then Principle V yields a graph given by Fig.8 ).
THEOREM 19 Dag-structure and Principle III imply Principle V.
The edges {X i , X l }, {X k , X l } (see Fig.9 ) are unbridged (because {X i , X j }, {X k , X j } are unbridged), hence their orientation head-to-head is excluded (as Principle II didn't orient them). Hence Figure 9 : Visualisation to the Proof of the Theorem on Principle V either we have orientation (X l , X i ) or (X l , X k ) Let us assume the orientation (X l , X i ) of {X i , X l }. Then if {X l , X j } would be oriented (X j , X l ) then X j , X l , X i would form an oriented cycle, hence H would not be a dag. So this is impossible.
Let us assume the orientation (X l , X k ) of {X k , X l }. Then if {X l , X j } would be oriented (X j , X l ) then X j , X l , X k would form an oriented cycle, hence H would not be a dag. So this is impossible.
Hence {X l , X j } must be oriented (X l , X j ) Q.e.d.✷
We conjecture furthermore that Let Γ be the set of directed graphs that represent DS-belief distribution Bel according to Principle III. Then Γ is also the set of directed graphs obtained from P by Principles I and II. This conjecture will be proven after showing some intermediate results.
We shall introduce first the notion of p-d-separation.
Definition 29 A p-trail in a pog is a sequence of links that form a path in the underlying undirected graph.
A node β is called a head-to-head node with respect to a p-trail t if there are two consecutive links α → β and β ← γ on that t. A p-trail is minimal iff no two of its succeeding links on the p-trail are bridged in the graph.
Definition 30 A p-descendent of a node n in a pog is any node m such that there exists a minimal p-trail from n to m such that every oriented link on the p-trail is oriented from n to m and an oriented edge (m,n) does not exist in the graph.
Definition 31 A p-trail t connecting nodes α and β is said to be active given a set of nodes L, if (1) every head-to-head-node wrt t either is or has a p-descendent in L and (2) every other node on t is outside L.
Otherwise t is said to be blocked (given L).
Definition 32 If J,K and L are three disjoint sets of nodes in a pog H, then L is said to p-d-separate J from K, denoted I(J, K|L) H iff no minimal p-trail between a node in J and a node in K is active given L.
We claim that THEOREM 20 Let L be a set of nodes in a pog H, and let α, β / ∈ L be two additional nodes in H. Then α and β are connected via an active p-trail (given L) iff α and β are connected via a simple (i.e. not possessing cycles in the underlying undirected graph) active p-trail (given L).
Now let us formulate the central theorem of this paper. So p-descendants are either descendants (OK) or are such predecessors, that they form together with the nodes of the primary p-trail but the discussed head-to-head node a minimal p-trail containing that predecessor as a head-to-head node and which proves to be an active trail in the dag (see Fig.10 ).
Let us consider an active minimal trail. We claim that then there exists a minimal p-trail. First of all all the successors are also p-successors. Second, a minimal trail is also a minimal p-trail. Now the question is whether or not it is also active. As the trail is minimal, no head-to-head meeting will vanish on the p-trail. Hence also the successor requirement is met. Let us define the legitimate removal of a node from the pog graph: a node can be removed legitimately from a pog iff all the oriented edges it meets are oriented towards it, and all pairs edges meeting at it for which at least one is unoriented, are bridged.
Pog-to-dag algorithm:
1. find a legitimately removable node in the pog, remove it with edges meeting it while marking the edges as oriented towards this node.
Proceed with
Step.1 until all the nodes are removed.
3. Orient the edges of the original pog so as they were marked in step 1.
(Compare Fig.8, Fig.11 ). We claim that:
THEOREM 22 Let there exist a dag obtainable from Principle III. Let G be a pog generated from Principles I, II, II c , IV and V. Then every dag obtained from the pog B by the above algorithm is a Principle III dag.
Every Principle III dag for this population is a dag obtainable from G by means of the above algorithm.
PROOF: This is easily seen as on the one hand every dag has a legitimately removable node, and on the other hand the orientations generated by the above algorithm do not lead to any conflict with Principles I,II,II c , IV and V, if a dag exists.
Q.e.d.✷
In this way we hope to have also shown the usefulness of Theorem 21 definitely, giving a constructive algorithm to generate the dag out of a pog which is necessary for belief network applications.
Figure 11: After legitimate removal of nodes X 3 , X 8 and X 9 . (The arrow (X 3 , X 4 ) was inforced). Nodes X 1 , X 4 , X 6 are legitimately removable. This is actually the main result of this paper with respect to structuring joint DS-belief distributions. It may be stated as follows:
THEOREM 23 Let Γ be the set of directed graphs that represent DS-belief distribution Bel according to Principle III. Then Γ is also the set of directed graphs obtained from P by Principles I and II.
PROOF: Let us look closely at Theorem 21. From Theorems 15 and 16 we know that any dag D in Γ must have been generated also by Principles I and II. As Principles II c , IV and V follow from Principles I and II and from the property of being a dag (look at Theorems 17, 18, 19), then any dag in Γ as generated by Principle III would also be generated by Principles I, II, II c , IV and V. Let us take now any of these dags in Γ, say D. Let us assume that from the respective pog H generated by Principles So we see immediately that any dag in Γ must have been generated by Principles I and II and all the dags derived via Principles I and II must be in Γ.
Q.e.d.✷ ❆ ❑ The non-existence of a dag may be attributed in the first two cases to existence of hidden variables, as
we can see from examples in Fig.12 (double orientation of an edge) and in Fig.13 (a directed cycle) . We shall, however, not discuss this issue at length here. It can be, however, easily checked that introduction of these additional hidden variables as indicated in both figures will not give rise to emerging of new independences, not present in the population.
But the third case is hard to resolve. Unless there exist information outside the data permitting to assume that the unexpected head-to-head-meeting will not introduce unjustified independences in the dag, there may exist the necessity to make a complete subgraph out of that part of the graph which leads to the unwished head-to-head meeting.
Summary and Outlook
In this paper, a general framework for recovery of a dag structure of a joint DS-belief distribution from data has been established, paralleling the work of Spirtes et al [13] on probabilistic networks. The proven theorems imply that it is possible to infer causal structure from data if this structure has the form of a directed acyclic graph. Strictly speaking: The statistical inference allows for deducing a set of such candidate causal structures with indication which fragment of the causal structure is shared by all the candidates. Over the last years a number of alternative methods to the algorithm of Spirtes et al [13] (both general and specialized) for construction of probabilistic belief networks has been proposed (compare the method described in [2] and other discussed in last sections therein). However, they were hardly transferable into the domain of DS-belief functions. For some special case, [7] offers solutions. The method investigated here deserves special attention because it relates the oriented structure of a directed acyclic graph representation to the causal relationship in the described part of reality. Two essential complementary conclusions can be drawn from proving theorem 21: (i) if one recovers a dag structure for the DS-belief distribution one derives more than just a formal description and (ii) for proper construction of a dag causality is essential.
Further research on the subject is needed, especially concerning approximations binding combinatorial explosion with the number of variables considered.
